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This article seeks to synthesize prior works on the rise of competitive
authoritarianism regimes at large using the case study of Turkey over the last
20 years. It does this by presenting markers of competitive authoritarian
regimes and explaining how they come to power and maintain it thereafter.
The paper then moves into the case study of Turkey and by using the
aforementioned markers, explains why competitive authoritarianism is the
most apt regime descriptor for Turkey at the present time. This is analyzed
more thoroughly in the way that Erdoğan and the AKP have cemented their
rule over the last two decades. This paper serves to flag different indicators
inherent to the consolidation of an autocratic state and act as a collection of
current scholarship on competitive authoritarianism in order to give it a more
holistic grounding.
PART I – INTRODUCTION
Beginning in the 1990s, the world began to experience a new political
phenomenon known as competitive authoritarianism. Competitive
authoritarian regimes have risen parallel to the wave of democratization that
swept across the globe following the end of the Cold War, as strictly
authoritarian regimes became more taboo and unacceptable without the
support from either of the two superpowers — the United States and the Soviet
Union. According to Levitsky andWay, in 2020 there are 32 regimes classified
as competitive authoritarian, a decrease of only three since 1995.¹ Of these 32
regimes, there is only a carry-over of sixteen competitive authoritarian
regimes from the original 35 in 1995; fifteen additional regimes have
democratized, and four have regressed even further into authoritarianism.
This means that in the last 25 years, sixteen new competitive authoritarian
regimes have arisen. But how has this trend continued with the seeming
democratic hegemony that the West promotes, and most importantly, how
have competitive authoritarian regimes maintained their status once
achieving it?
There are numerous reasons as to how a competitive authoritarian
regime comes to exist in the modern era. These include, but are not limited to,
the presence of a populist leader, weak democratic institutions, interplay
between business interests and political interests, the decline of the western
liberal democratic hegemony, and — most decisively — subtlety and the
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primary reasons as to how competitive authoritarian regimes come into
power, they maintain and consolidate power through equally lucrative actions
and opportunities: infighting amongst their political opposition, corruption of
informal institutions, and neutralization of formal democratic institutions. All
actions taken by aspiring autocrats are done in order to skew the political
playing field in their favor, a trending theme throughout competitive
authoritarian regimes.
One of the most prominent cases of the democratic decline into
competitive authoritarianism that has continued throughout the previous two
decades is that of Turkey. The Turkish case shares all of these contributing
factors, and thus is a perfect case study to exemplify the inception and
preservation of competitive authoritarian regimes in the international and
national contexts. This paper uses the Turkish case to highlight competitive
authoritarian trends that can lead to the deterioration of democratic
institutions and general negative influence on democratic backsliding at large.
PART II – IDENTIFYING COMPETITIVE AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES
A key component of the new wave of authoritarian regimes is the
“pretense of democracy.”² The pretense of democracy is one of the most
prevalent factors in distinguishing a full-blown authoritarian regime from a
competitive one. Under the guise of democracy, competitive authoritarian
regimes come about through relatively peaceful, electoral means, rather than
in violent takeovers as they “legitimize themselves through multi-party
elections and referenda.”³ A competitive authoritarian system would also
continue to use the guise of democracy by allowing universal or near universal
suffrage whilst using other methods to aid in electoral victories. Gilbert and
Mohseni identify competitiveness, tutelary interference, and civil liberties as,
“the three dimensions that are important for regime classification today.”⁴
Keeping this in mind, we can then base our identifying markers of
competitive authoritarianism into affecting one or more of these three
categories that in turn determine regime typology. Svolik goes further than
this, confining democracy to two fundamental aspects: “(1) free and
competitive legislative elections and (2) an executive that is elected either
directly in free and competitive presidential elections or indirectly by a
legislature in parliamentary systems.”⁵ However, Svolik rejects the idea of
hybrid regimes outright, and adheres to a strict dichotomy of either
“democratic” or “authoritarian” regime types. This paper refutes Svolik’s
premise, providing evidence that a simple democratic-authoritarian
dichotomy does not grasp intermediary regime positions and aptly classify
them. Furthermore, Svolik uses democracy and dictatorships as broad
categorizations of regime types that this study treats as a multitude.
Narrowing regime types to this dichotomy allows for less nuance in regime
descriptors and could allow for misinterpretations of a regime’s attributes.
Following this clarification, we can now use the preceding stipulations on
regime type to better identify competitive authoritarianism. The suspected
competitive authoritarian regime must then have come to power through
democratic means, consolidating power through repeated electoral victories
and allowing some semblance of universal, adult suffrage, moderately
competitive elections, and some protected civil liberties in order to meet our
criteria. Levitsky and Way put it quite succinctly: “[s]uch regimes are
competitive in that opposition parties use democratic institutions to contest
seriously for power, but they are not democratic because the playing field is
heavily skewed in favor of incumbents. Competition is thus real but unfair.”⁶
Using Tóth’s framework as a basis, competitive authoritarian regimes can
be identified through two sets of indicators: first-order and second-order
markers of competitive authoritarianism. Both sets of markers are identical in
name to their counterparts, but operate in distinctly different ways to achieve
the same outcome. First order markers are the most fundamental and blatant
form, “detected in either constitutional norms or practices of an authoritarian
system.”⁷ The second-order markers create a normative justification for
authoritarianism by manipulating constitutional tools to create norms and
practices that feign democracy while furthering authoritarian agendas. This
second set of markers are typically more discreet than the constitutional and
political changes of first-order markers. These indicators of competitive
authoritarian regimes can include a pseudo-constitution, hegemonic voting
practices, imitation of institutional checks, a superior executive, and
restriction of fundamental rights.
A normal, democratic constitution is typically the “ultimate legal control
on political processes,”⁸ which limits the arbitrary use of power. In contrast,
authoritarian constitutions are merely a facade in order to give “democratic
legitimation” to the actions of autocrats. Aspiring authoritarians would then
seek to manipulate constitutions to benefit their polity, primarily through
majoritarian referenda or executive powers. A secondary effect of
constitutional change, or pseudo-adoption, is the normalization of radical or
exorbitant changes to the political framework of a nation.
Similar to the democratic legitimation provided by pseudo-constitutions,
hegemonic voting practices use legal norms and practices to ensure the
dominance of the ruling party as well as modified forms of clientelism. In their
research, Gandhi and Lust-Okar found that one of the primary reasons for
maintaining elections under authoritarian regimes is to ensure loyalty of elites
and provide domestic and international facades of democracy, thus “[t]he
issues at stake, the incentives for participation, and the resulting electoral
behavior are strikingly different.”⁹ This serves to reinforce hegemonic voting
practices to either further entrench the incumbent regime, or dissuade
prospective opponents. A second-order hegemonic voting practice marker is
when a competitive authoritarian regime uses a majoritarian voting system —
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utilizing both first-past-the-post and a proportional representation voting
system—that is manipulated through external voting laws in order to produce
a hegemonic order. This hegemonic order then allows the ruling party to win
amajority of legislative seats whilst receiving less than what would be required
to achieve such a feat.¹⁰ Voting practices within regimes are key determinants
of their classification. However, the extent to which voting practices are
encouraged or discouraged determines a regime type. Gilbert and Mohseni
argue that if a regime shifts from “competitive” multi-party elections to
noncompetitive or single-party elections, it is more akin to authoritarianism
than competitive authoritarianism, making the necessity of hegemonic voting
a crucial component in competitive authoritarian regimes.¹¹
The imitation of institutional checks works jointly with the pseudo-
constitution to give the illusion of democracy and therefore further the powers
of autocrats. All three branches of government remain, but they no longer
operate as checks and balances and rather are neutralized so they can no
longer perform their intended function. Imitating institutional checks allows
the ruling party to invoke a “we the people” rhetorical narrative that gives
legislative elected bodies more credibility than judicial bodies — turning legal
authority into political authority — as it is, in theory, representative of the
desires of the people.¹²
As a result of the constitutional checks and balances either being
nonexistent or unenforced by the judiciary, the executive branch — typically
just the chief executor — is left with unchecked superior power. The broad and
ill-defined powers of an executive allow it to gain a superior foothold in the
political landscape in contrast to the two other branches of government. For
example, during a democratic or national crisis that would constitute a
declaration of emergency, the chief executor could then use whatever means
they deem “necessary” to quell said emergency. This would not directly seem
endemic to authoritarianism, but would allow an executor to use extrajudicial
means to institutionalize their executive power without the constraints of the
law.¹³
Finally, as a consequence of the constitution’s lack of enforcement,
fundamental rights can be restricted despite provisions to protect them within
the constitution. Human rights are then subject to violation without
repercussion. As opposed to normal authoritarian regimes, a competitive
authoritarian regime may use mass capture of the media in order to restrict
free speech or create costly and discriminatory requirements for the
registration of civil societies in order to dissuade their existence. The
restriction of fundamental human rights as a second-order marker requires
the ruling regime to paint certain injustices above others, which would then
allow them to restrict the people’s right to the former. Tóth offers the example
of freedom of speech as opposed to human dignity. The argument stems from
whether the freedom of speech takes precedence over one’s dignity. A
competitive authoritarian regime would claim that this idea of dignity could
expand to encompass the dignity of a demographic group, or even a nation;
thus the dignity of a nation is more important than the freedom of speech.¹⁴
Both first-order and second-order markers are necessary in understanding
how competitive authoritarian regimes differ from outright authoritarianism
and democracy.
PART III – WHY COMPETITIVE AUTHORITARIANISM? THE TERMINOLOGY
Now that we understand what constitutes competitive authoritarianism,
the next step is to determine why this is themost apt terminology in describing
this regime type. In the same work by Tóth, they compile a comprehensive list
of others’ works to provide three primary aims in which to identify a regime:
1. An aim to characterize a system that merges two opposite systems
(Hybrid/Mixed System).
2. An aim to characterize the system from a democratic lens as it holds
more traits akin to a democratic system (Defective Democracy,
Populist Democracy, Leader Democracy, etc.).
3. An aim to characterize the system from an authoritarian lens as it
holds more traits similar to an authoritarian system (Semi
authoritarianism, competitive authoritarianism, electoral
authoritarianism, etc.).¹⁵
Seen through Tóth’s terminological scope,Wigell’s work pertaining to the
identification of hybrid regimes is also relevant. Wigell insists that we must
approach the topic of hybrid regimes through a two-dimensional typology
rather than one-dimensional: mapping regimes in a chart with “electoralism”
increasing along the y axis and “constitutionalism” increasing along the x axis.
Wigell’s more nuanced terminology displays the fluidity of regime types that
allow us to place competitive authoritarianism in the first quadrant, as it uses
electoralism as its primary means of legitimation and shies away from
constitutionalism.¹⁶ Gilbert and Mohseni expand on this multi-dimensional
regime classification by their use of levels of competitiveness (x-axis), tutelary
interference (z-axis), and civil liberties (y-axis) as regime classifiers, allowing
us to better understand regimes on a case by case basis. This multi-
dimensional classification exceeds Wigell’s two-dimensional typology,
creating a four-dimensional model built off the three aforementioned
classifiers. However, they also note that the classification of regimes does not
reflect true reality, as classification systems are social constructs, but “the
further clarification of regime classification is both necessary and possible.”¹⁷
For the purposes of this study, we will be using the third aim of
identification presented by Tóth as it is most suitable in matching with our
case study at the markers that constitute it; as the first aim is too vague and
does not account for the nuance that is achieved through more specific
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terminology and the second aim lends too much credit towards the pseudo-
democratic institutions that exist in Turkey to be used. Following Gilbert and
Mohseni’s cubic model of regime classification, Turkey would, as of 2020, fall
close to “Illiberal Tutelary Hybrid Regime,” with a slight inching toward
“Authoritarian.” This would make Turkey competitive, like in an “Illiberal
Tutelary Hybrid Regime,” but with even more limited rights than typically
found in a regime of this classification.¹⁸ This falls in line with the recent
trend, referring to regimes that meet a certain criteria as subsets of
authoritarianism rather than democracy, or a more obscure “hybrid”
terminology.¹⁹ Competitive authoritarianism is the most appropriate term to
use to describe both the Turkish case and the factors that constitute the regime
type being discussed. The nuance behind this terminology accurately accounts
for both competitive authoritarianism’s electoralism and lack of
constitutionalism that allows for abuses of the electorate and consolidation of
executive power.
PART IV – HOW COMPETITIVE AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES COME TO POWER
In their investigation of this post-Cold War phenomenon, Levitsky and
Way’s “Elections Without Democracy: The Rise of Competitive
Authoritarianism,” identify areas that are unfavorable to democracy and are
consequently susceptible to authoritarian regression such as low income, little
to no democratic tradition, weak institutions and rule of law, underdeveloped
private sectors and civil societies, and feeble opposition parties.²⁰ However,
with the authoritarian transition of Turkey, and similar nations like Hungary
that counter these claims, it forces both us and the aforementioned authors to
reconsider factors that may be most prevalent in determining what causes
competitive authoritarian regimes to arise. The key factors attributed to the
rise of a competitive authoritarian regime are populism, weak democratic
institutions, corrupt business relationships with governments, decline of
western democratic hegemony, and subtlety of policy implementation.
Regimes do not require all of the previous factors in order to transition into
competitive authoritarianism, but the more that are present would
theoretically increase the likelihood of transition. Aspiring autocrats may not
even be directly aware of their desire to transition from a democracy into a
competitive authoritarian government. Their primary goal is to tilt the playing
field in their favor in order to aid or even guarantee future electoral victories;
this could be done completely unwittingly of the future descent into
competitive authoritarianism.
POPULISM
A common theme in most competitive authoritarian regimes, and
something that can be instrumental to their rise, is the presence of a populist
leader or party. Populism and populists exist in contention with the formal
democratic institutions of the current regime as they rise to power through
anti-establishment rhetoric, creating an ‘us’ vs. ‘them’ divide, and once in
power adhere to their anti-establishment basis by attacking existing horizontal
institutions.²¹ Populists gain power through electoral means and can be
accompanied or backed by a majoritarian presence in the legislation which
would enable them to make sweeping institutional changes. The election of a
full populist can trigger constitutional crises depending on their level of
aggression towards other formal institutions like the judiciary.²² Populism is
not a requirement of competitive authoritarianism, but acts as a catalyst for
authoritarian actions in regimes.
WEAK DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND THE DECLINE OF WESTERN LIBERAL HEGEMONY
The presence of weak democratic institutions, primarily tutelary
democracies, that are not actual consolidated democracies but only give the
appearance as such, provide an opening for aspiring autocrats to take hold and
manipulate the current system as long as they are able to circumvent the veto-
players.²³ Veto-players — the judiciary and the military — are the only
institutional defenders of the constitution within countries that have weak
informal democratic institutions. A majoritarian electoral victory can pave the
way for the rise of a new competitive authoritarian regime. The decline of the
Western liberal hegemony internationally, coupled with the rise of China and
Russia provided the opportunity for the rise of competitive authoritarian
regimes.²⁴
Following the dissolution of the USSR in 1991, a wave of democratization
and partial democratization swept across the planet. This resulted in the
creation of a number of unstable democracies that have either continued to
democratize or reverted towards authoritarianism, depending on their
continual linkage and desire for linkage to the West.²⁵ For newly
democratized central and eastern European states, the most prominent form
of Western linkage is the presence of the European Union (EU). Through the
EU accession process, states such as Hungary and Turkey had incentives to
continue their democratization process or maintain a certain level of
democratization, typically a tutelary one.²⁶ As the Western liberal hegemony
has seen a slow downturn in recent decades, Russia and China have risen to
replace them. While these new global powers have not fought as ardently as
their predecessors to establish similar regimes internationally, their
prominence continues to be relevant on the international stage. Acting as a
substitute for the market provided by the western hegemony, states with
authoritarian inclinations no longer must uphold democratic institutions to
continue business with the West. As of 2019, of the 32 competitive
authoritarian regimes in the world, “six were [once] high- linkage countries in
the Americas and East-Central Europe and two additional high-linkage
countries, Nicaragua and Venezuela, are now fully authoritarian.”²⁷
This transition represents a shift in the international community, one
that had previously been staunchly in opposition to forms of authoritarianism.
Now that there are alternative market and allyship options, an authoritarian
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regime no longer has the same consequences that it once had.
SUBTLETY AND THE DEMOCRATIC PRETENSE
The mode by which leaders and their parties change policy, legislation,
etc. in order to consolidate power in autocratic means is key to their rise.
Subtlety is necessary to the rise of any competitive authoritarian government.
Aspiring autocrats must reform their constitutions, ending horizontal
accountability (i.e. checks and balances) in order to gain substantial power to
rule unhindered, but if this is done too bluntly it can result in international or
national backlash. These actions must come about under the guise of
democracy, typically under the pretense of majoritarianism, that
constitutional checks such as the judiciary or constitutional limitations are
antidemocratic as they don’t adhere to the majority of the population’s politics
as argued by the aspiring autocrat.²⁸ Through the amalgamation of a
democratic pretense and the transition into quasi-constitutionalism,
competitive authoritarianism arises as it claims to abide by democratic
principles with authoritarian outcomes.
PART V – HOW COMPETITIVE AUTHORITARIANISM PERSEVERES AND EXPANDS ITSELF
Following the establishment of a competitive authoritarian regime, their
primary goal, like all regimes, is to maintain their status and expand or
consolidate their power. A majority of the preservation and expansion periods
are merely continued processes undertaken in order to gain power in the first
place. The two central pillars continue to be the neutralization of formal
democratic norms and institutions as well as the corruption of informal
institutions: through non-legislative methods, civil societies, and the creation
of pro-regime business blocs. In addition to these two components, infighting
amongst opposition parties can also be credited in maintaining a competitive
authoritarian regime. This list is non-exhaustive but seeks to explain the most
prominent reasons that competitive authoritarianism is allowed to continue
and, in some cases, thrive.
NEUTRALIZATION OF FORMAL NORMS AND INSTITUTIONS
Once established, an authoritarian regime must continue to neutralize
democratic norms and institutions through constitutional and legislative
reform in order to consolidate power and end horizontal accountability. This
is done through continuous majoritarian victories in the legislation to keep
legislative power coupled with executive power in order to render the judiciary
useless.²⁹ This key feature is one of the most distinguishing differences
between classic authoritarianism and competitive authoritarianism. The
ascent of competitive authoritarianism is not as swift as a military coup–as
many autocrats come to power—but is stretched throughout multiple terms in
the electorate that serves to legitimize its rule in a casual manner as to not
arouse suspicion of the intent behind majoritarian legislation.³⁰ Gilbert and
Mohseni identify turnover as a prime indicator in this process, establishing “at
least four consecutive electoral cycles or twenty years in either the presidency
or the legislature” as the requirement to avoid autocratic consolidation.³¹
Once formal institutions have been neutralized, it allows for the ruling party to
begin an assault on informal institutions that would have been protected by
the now inadequate formal institutions.
CORRUPTION OF INFORMAL INSTITUTIONS
Conjoined with the subversion of formal institutions is the corruption of
informal institutions; which allows a regime to use civilian or non-legislative
means to consolidate their power. Due to the expansive field that makes up
informal institutions, there are a litany of ways that a government can
interfere in informal democratic institutions: clientelism, corruption, putsch
threat, civil disobedience, and custom law.³² By participating in these tactics,
a government weakens the democratic base of a state.
A prominent mode of corrupting informal democratic institutions is to
create illicit relationships between autocratic parties and domestic businesses
(clientelism) which greatly contributes to the preservation and expansion of
competitive authoritarianism. Both Levitsky and Way³³ and Esen and
Gumuscu³⁴ point to the importance of building a pro-government business
class, which is then used by incumbents to expand their parties and even
government’s resources and call in favors depending on the business type.
With informal control over large sectors of private business, the ruling party is
then allowed to gain an upper hand and continue to skew the playing field in
their favor.
INFIGHTING AMONGST OPPOSITION GROUPS
One factor that is not engendered through the state’s actions is the
historical existence of infighting between opposition groups. Since competitive
authoritarian regimes still maintain an electoral element, opposition parties
are able to still win legislative seats despite actions taken against them;
however, when opposition parties refuse to work together to create collation
parties, it markedly buffets their ability to gain electoral victories.
All the actions of a competitive authoritarian regime are done in order to
tilt the electoral playing field in favor of the party in power. The
aforementioned factors that work in the perseverance of an already
established competitive authoritarian regime visibly manifest themselves in
politicized state institutions, violation of civil liberties (media, expression, and
assembly), and uneven access to resources. All three of these manifestations
are overwhelmingly present in modern Turkey under current president Recep
Tayyip Erdoğan and his Justice and Development Party or Adalet ve Kalkınma
Partisi (AKP).
PART VI – COMPETITIVE AUTHORITARIANISM IN TURKEY: 2001-PRESENT
Turkey’s current status as a competitive authoritarian state has come
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about in the last two decades, following the rise of Erdoğan and the AKP.
According to the V- Dem Electoral Democracy Index (pictured on the
following page), Turkish democracy peaked in 2006 at .71, but has been on the
decline since then. It crossed beneath the democratic threshold of .5 in 2014,
and as of 2018 it sits at .32. Following an almost identical trajectory are civil
liberties and freedom of expression.³⁵ In fact, prior to its current regime it was
recognized as a fairly stable democracy, despite its tutelary attributes. Turkey
had a long multiparty democratic tradition, a stable mid-level income, status
within the EU, and proliferation of resources.³⁶ In the following section, the
distinguishing elements of the Turkish regime will be reviewed and explained
as to why it is currently labeled as competitive authoritarianism. However,
prior to that discussion, it is important to note the prevailing factors that
prevent Turkey from being labeled as a complete authoritarian regime. These
include the fact that there is universal suffrage and the authority of elected
officials are not restricted by tutelary powers.³⁷ There are an abundance of
examples of competitive authoritarian activity in the Turkish case, but for our
efforts, we will focus primarily on those that best highlight Turkey’s current
status. Conversely, the other defining traits of competitive authoritarianism
that are present in Turkey are politicized state institutions, violation of civil
liberties, and uneven access to resources. All of these factors work jointly to
skew the electoral playing field in order to maintain the incumbent powers of
Erdoğan and the AKP.
THE RISE OF ERDOGAN AND THE AKP
The current president of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, was first elected
to public office in 1994 as mayor of Istanbul where he served until 1998. He
was then imprisoned and temporarily banned from politics after reciting an
Islamist militant poem. In 2001, Turkey underwent a major financial crisis
where the GDP dropped 4.49% and 7.18% from 1999 to 2001.³⁸ As a result, a
majority of its citizenry became dissatisfied by themajor political parties of the
time, which allowed Erdoğan and the AKP to come to the forefront of the
political stage, adhering to a similar path laid out by Levitsky and Loxton.³⁹ In
the past, as recently as 1998, the constitutional court upheld its historic
Kemalist ruling on Islamist parties by closing the Welfare Party (WP).⁴⁰ The
AKP altered its platform from an Islamic conservatism to moderate democrats
in an attempt to gain more support. Erdoğan and the AKP’s outsider status
paired well with their newfound populist platform and ushered them into
office with 34% of the vote.⁴¹
As the AKP took power in the legislature, Erdoğan was selected as the
new prime minister in the 2002 elections. Now that he had gained power, he
once again began to use the anti-establishment, populist rhetoric he had
previously toned down. An additional safeguard that aided Erdoğan was his
alliance with the EU. This legitimized his status internally and internationally,
allowing him to fight against the establishment without resorting to
plebiscitary strategies that would almost certainly bring about the intervention
of the Kemalist tutelary institutions. Throughout the rest of this legislative
term, Erdoğan and the AKP continuously butted heads with the judiciary and
military institutions, which boiled over during the 2007 election cycle. After
triggering an institutional crisis following his denial of all secularist candidates
and implementation of plebiscitary methods, the military and judiciary
attempted to step in and unseat him. However, backed by the ideas held by
international democratic institutions, Erdoğan denounced any judicial or
military action as antidemocratic and held early voting for the presidential and
parliamentary elections. The AKP won 57% of the vote in parliament while
Abdullah Gül—the AKP’s presidential candidate—won with 70% of the vote.⁴²
A majority legislative and executive win gave Erdoğan and the AKP near
complete control of the government. Erdoğan then used this win to institute
sweeping reforms of the judiciary system, pacifying the last veto-player in
Erdoğan’s way, which began Turkey’s descent into competitive
authoritarianism.
The AKP and Erdoğan continued to consolidate power through the
coming elections and in 2014, Erdoğan was elected president. As president
and leader of the party, he effectively gained control of both the legislature and
executive branches of the government—since the judiciary had been rendered
useless by previous constitutional reforms—and virtually unchecked power. In
2016, after a failed coup attempt by the military, Erdoğan ushered in a set of
constitutional reforms that led to “ultra-presidentialism,”⁴³ consolidating
even more powers within the office of the chief executor. Erdoğan reportedly
referred to the attempted coup as “a gift from god.”⁴⁴ This reform was
Figure 1: Turkey’s scores on the V-DEM Civil Liberties Index, Freedom of
Expression Index, and Electoral Democracy Index, shown from 1990-2018
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permitted due to the failings of opposition parties as well as a surge of support
for the government. However, in recent years the outstanding support for the
Erdoğan regime has begun to diminish. In the snap elections of 2018, Erdoğan
was reelected, but only with 52.9% of the vote. Similarly, in the parliament, the
AKP lost 7% of its total vote compared to 2015 which brought its overall
percentage to 42.56.⁴⁵
POLITICIZED STATE INSTITUTIONS
A common theme dealt with by both populists and competitive
authoritarians is the politicization of state institutions, or the fusion of state
and party. This is extremely evident in Turkish politics. Only focusing on the
election cycle of 2015, we find numerous violations of state-party relations.
Throughout 2015, Erdoğan used public openings of state projects to hold
campaign rallies. These public events allowed the AKP to conduct political
propaganda and gain visibility at the taxpayer’s expense. AKP-appointed
provincial governors distributed goods to voters, whilst promoting the party
during official functions. Most notably, the government used state employees,
particularly police forces, to both work on AKP electoral campaigns and to
undermine the efforts of the opposition. State employees were documented
removing opposition campaign posters and confiscating anti-government
propaganda materials. One of the more notable instances of police
interference took place in May 2015, when Turkish security forces blocked the
entrance of a Secularist Republican People’s Party’s (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi,
CHP) election vehicle to a public square. As a result of the blockade, the CHP
was forced to campaign in severely less populated areas of town. In a similar
vein, opposition forces were constrained to campaigning within their electoral
strongholds, rather than incumbent strongholds or battleground areas.⁴⁶
Limiting the permissible areas that a party can campaign severely affects their
ability to expand their electorate, by constricting their reach, and locking in
their previous constituency as their prescribed voting bloc. While this does not
directly limit the suffrage of the electorate, it completely skews the extent at
which an opposition party can reach potential voters in order to appeal to
them or flip their vote.
VIOLATION OF CIVIL LIBERTIES (MEDIA, EXPRESSION, AND ASSEMBLY)
The violation of civil liberties is the most prevalent and invasive trait of
competitive authoritarianism. The violations of liberties most exemplified by
the Erdoğan regime are the suppression of media, expression, and assembly.
The Human Rights Watch has denigrated Turkey’s government, saying in a
2014 report, “In office for twelve years under the leadership of Recep Tayyip
Erdoğan the AKP has shown increasing intolerance of political opposition,
public protest, and critical media.”⁴⁷ The violations of civil liberties by the
Turkish State registered by the courts between 2011 and 2013, indicted them
“for frequent violations of the right to a fair trial, property rights, and the right
to liberty and security.”⁴⁸ This began to change in 2014, when violations of
freedom of expression ranked third in violations after the right to liberty and
security and the right to a fair trial. Using the V-DEM civil liberties and
freedom of expression indexes graph on page 14, we can quantify this decline
by election cycles: in 2002—when Erdoğan first came to power— civil liberties
were rated at .68, they later peaked in 2004 at .76, and have been on the
decline since then, dropping to .66 in 2010, .53 in 2014, and .32 in 2018.⁴⁹
An overall contributing factor to censorship, propaganda, and the
violation of civil liberties has been the continuous AKP intervention within the
media landscape in Turkey. The AKP created a government friendly media by
disciplining mainstream media via intimidation, mass firings, imprisonment
of journalists, and bribing media owners. The AKP would then use the
National Broadcasting Authority (RTUK) to control media outlets, like Dogan
Media or the Gülen Movement.⁵⁰ The RTUK would order closure of
broadcasting stations, fine companies for alleged tax evasion, raid stations,
and even detained station executives, journalists, and other media workers. In
order to keep TV stations and newspapers in line, the government has
appointed pro-regime managers and journalists to them that work as
government representatives and supervisors that alter news content at the
behest of the state.
The years of 2011 through 2013 witnessed three major waves of mass
media firings: in June 2011 when the AKP won its third term; December 2011
when the Turkish air force killed 34 smugglers mistaken for Kurdish
insurgents; and in 2013 during the Gezi Park protests, resulting in the firings
or resignations of 143 journalists. In 2014 alone, 339 journalists lost their jobs,
and in addition, politicized trials aimed to disassemble opposition parties and
jail journalists that dared to report on it.⁵¹ In 2002, Turkey ranked 99th on the
press freedom index by Reporters without Borders, but by 2014 their ranking
had declined to 154th, which remains the same ranking as of the year 2020.⁵²
Mirroring an almost parallel path taken with Turkish media, in the last
decade the AKP has ramped up its repression of expression; most notably
through laws restricting access to social media and other websites. After a
corruption scandal came to light in December 2013, the government blocked
both YouTube and Twitter until the March 2014 elections. Earlier in that same
year, in February the legislation amended the Internet Law (Law No. 5651)
which expanded the Telecommunications Authority’s (TIB) jurisdiction. A
now deleted civil initiative that tracked digital intervention by the Turkish
government found that the total number of blocked websites as of 2016 could
amount to as much as 103,625.⁵³ Succeeding the Gezi Protests in 2013,
approximately 5500 protesters between the years of 2013-2016 have been
charged with “terrorism, participating in unauthorized demonstrations,
resisting the police, and damaging public property.”⁵⁴ This is a clear-cut
example of the Turkish government’s overreach in an effort to quell public
dissent and dissuade further anti-regime protests.
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The federal government used lawsuits to target journalists, artists, actors,
and a number of other civilians, including underage students, for dissent and
a litany of other charges. Just in 2015, 460 people were investigated simply for
insulting Erdoğan. Of these investigations, 50 were journalists and 281 were
members of opposition parties. In an increasingly corrupt manner, Erdoğan
has made 1,031,243 Turkish lira as a result of 207 defamation lawsuits since
2011 (as of 2016).⁵⁵ The AKP regime has continuously, and without relent,
breached the Turkish people’s rights to self-expression by silencing journalists
and regular citizens alike in order to maintain its stranglehold on the public
discourse within Turkey.
As support for the AKP has dwindled over the last decade, the regime has
begun to use violence in order to maintain control of both the public narrative
of the country and protection of their electoral status. This has been done
through a rampant increase in state brutality of protestors, opposition parties,
and political and ethnic minorities alike. The three prime examples of this
have been in response to the 2013 Gezi Protests, the ongoing conflict with the
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP),
and the government backlash after the 2016 coup attempt.
Throughout the Gezi Protests in 2013 (a response to government plans to
replace the Gezi Park with a mall and a military barracks) riot police
“punished” protestors with “extensive and unlawful” amounts of tear gas.
Reports on the injuries and casualties of the protest range from 5-6 individuals
killed, and more than 9,000 injuries, including “severe eye and head
injuries.”⁵⁶ Protests commenced on the anniversary of the Gezi protests and
were met with continued suppression tactics.
The HDP and PKK have systematically been the victims of human and
civil rights abuses for years at the hands of the Erdoğan regime after their
initial amiable relations. BetweenMarch and June 2015 there were 176 attacks
on the HDP, resulting in five deaths and 522 injuries. Following the June 2015
elections, in July a suicide bomber targeted a group of HDP activists in Suruc
that killed 33. Later that same year, in October, there was a similar attack on
an HDP peace rally in Ankara which killed 102, injuring 400 more. While the
AKP government was not directly responsible for the attacks, their anti-
opposition rhetoric and slow action or even inaction in bringing justice to the
perpetrators of the attacks has acted as a stimulant.⁵⁷
Not even a year later, following the 2016 coup attempt, the Turkish
government harshly stepped up their repressive actions and purged public
offices, media, law firms, and other parts of the private sectors of dissidents.
According to a report by Nate Schenkkan of Freedom House, 50,546 people
were arrested; 103,824 were dismissed from public service—with an
additional 33,824 suspended; 166 journalists were taken into custody as well
as hundreds of lawyers; more than ten billion dollars’ worth of private
companies were seized; 150 media outlets were closed by decree; and 1,000
non-governmental organizations were closed by decree. Of the opposition, two
leaders and nine parliamentarians of the HDP and the leader of the CHP were
jailed. In addition to the incarcerations, dozens of elected mayors in Kurdish
municipalities were replaced with AKP appointees.⁵⁸
UNEVEN ACCESS TO RESOURCES
Following the 2015 election, the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) released a report on the uneven access to
media within Turkey. They found that state-owned media, Turkish Radio and
Television (TRT), devoted 46% of its airtime to the AKP with additional time
reserved for Erdoğan. Even private media outlets, such as NTV and ATV,
allocated 1/3 of their airtime to the AKP. In total, the largest opposition party,
CHP, only received 19% of political ads. This is not only a result of politicized
government institutes, but also the disproportionate resource allocation
between the ruling party and the opposition. The AKP bought 91% of all
political ads that aired on TRT, and simultaneously TRT refused to air CHP
campaign ads.⁵⁹
In addition to access to extra-monetary resources, one of the crucial traits
of the AKP is its vast wealth. Three of the most notable cases that demonstrate
both the corruption and unevenness of the AKP have been Deniz Feneri,
TURGEV, and Sivil Dayanisma Platformu. Deniz Feneri was a charity based in
Turkey — with branches in Germany as well — that gained notoriety in 2008
after collecting about €41 million for earthquake relief in Indonesia; however,
16 million of those euros were actually funneled to the AKP. German Courts
indicted the charity on embezzlement charges, stating that the charity had
close connections with the AKP elite.⁶⁰ TURGEV, a foundation actually
established by Erdoğan and his family, were revealed to have direct links with
pro-APK businessmen, the majority of which were recipients of government
contracts. In 2014, in response to a CHP inquiry, the speaker of the
government confirmed that it had collected millions in donations.⁶¹
The final of the three major actors was the Sivil Dayanisma Platformu
(Civil Solidarity Platform), which was established as a network of civil society
organizations with close ties to the Erdoğan regime. The society lobbied on
behalf of Erdoğan following corruption scandals in December 2013. It went on
to place ads supporting the prime minister, at the time, in 4000 different
locations throughout Istanbul prior to the March 2014 elections – the costs of
which were covered by regime-friendly businessmen.⁶²
PART VII – CONCLUSION
Since the AKP first came to the center stage of Turkish politics in 2001,
we have witnessed a continual downward spiral in regard to protection of civil
liberties, a fair and equitable playing field in regard to electoral politics, and
outright oppression by the state. It is due to these contributing factors that
Turkey’s once tutelary democracy has taken a swift downturn towards
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competitive authoritarianism, and is on track to a fully autocratic regime in the
coming years. While the AKP has grown with formidable efficiency in the past
two decades, since 2018 we have seen a continuance in this regressive trend
toward unmitigated authoritarianism following their repeated decline in
national support. The following years will be pivotal in adjudicating the extent
of Erdoğan’s willingness to maintain power in an unstable political climate
that is slowly unraveling.
As we have seen through the Turkish case, competitive authoritarianism
has become increasingly more prominent in one of the world’s largest
countries, as Turkey’s continued degeneration of democratic institutions and
civil liberties has been met with relatively little substantive international
backlash. Turkey’s current brand of competitive authoritarianism threatens
democratic stability globally, paving the way for other regimes to follow in the
footsteps of Erdoğan and the AKP.
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